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ESSAY 
RULE-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
Rachel Brewster
INTRODUCTION 
HY does the United States ever prefer to settle disputes un-
der a system of rules rather than a system of negotiations? 
Power has its privileges, and one is the ability to control interna-
tional negotiations. Powerful states are advantaged by negotiation-
based approaches to settling disagreements because they have the 
resources to resolve individual disputes on favorable terms. By 
contrast, rule-based dispute resolution advantages weak states as a 
means to hold powerful states to the terms of their agreements. 
W 
Yet the United States government led the charge for rule-based 
dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
American representatives consistently negotiated for a strong trade 
court over the resistance of other major industrialized govern-
ments.1 Since that time, the United States has, predictably, been 
both a winner and loser in the process. It has successfully chal-
lenged European Union restrictions on American imports but 
failed in a challenge to the structure of the photographic film mar-
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ket in Japan. In addition, the United States has lost several cases 
concerning its own laws, including complaints against its tax system 
and environmental regulations. 
The U.S. government’s decision to champion a trade court is 
puzzling given the obvious American advantage in a negotiation-
based system. Access to the U.S. market is one of the primary 
benefits of membership in the WTO and, by limiting access to its 
market, the United States can resolve trading disputes on favorable 
terms. For years, the United States did exactly this—using the 
threat of unilateral sanctions to resolve issues of foreign market ac-
cess while interpreting its own laws to be consistent with interna-
tional obligations. Why would the United States give up this flexi-
bility in favor of a strong international court? 
This Essay will address both the puzzle of the United States’ 
preference for rule-based dispute resolution and the broader impli-
cations for international law. First, it will examine why the U.S. 
government demanded an international court that would limit its 
bargaining power in international politics and will argue that the 
WTO system strengthens the President’s hand in trade policy nego-
tiations with Congress. The United States’ preference—or more 
specifically, the President’s preference—for a rule-based system 
derives, in part, from the President’s efforts to gain greater control 
over trade policy at the national level. In short, a trade court im-
poses an international constraint that actually increases the Presi-
dent’s power over lawmaking at home. 
This Essay will then turn to the broader implications for interna-
tional law. It will show how domestic actors—here, the President—
may use international law to try to change domestic politics. In do-
ing so, I will consider how we define what is in “the state’s inter-
ests.” States, particularly developed democracies, have complex 
decision-making procedures. Various players within the domestic 
government may have dissimilar preferences for policies and, thus, 
different conceptions of what is in the best interests of the state. 
What we conceive of as the state’s interests are the outcomes of the 
domestic political process. International law influences these state 
interests by altering bargaining power among different players 
within the government and thereby changing the outcome of do-
mestic politics. 
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This understanding differs from others that focus on the “com-
pliance pull” of international law. There, international interactions, 
international networks, and domestic lobbying are thought to lead 
government officials to alter their conceptions of state interest. 
Under the view presented here, government officials’ interests do 
not change to value international law over national law. Rather, 
they value international law when it offers an advantage in domes-
tic politics. 
This Essay will proceed in five Parts. Part I will briefly describe 
the WTO system and focus on how the United States’ bargaining 
position under this system differs from that enjoyed under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) system. Part 
II will illustrate how current international law studies do not ade-
quately explain why the United States sought a rule-based system. 
Parts III and IV will present the domestic-politics approach to un-
derstanding the government’s preferences concerning dispute reso-
lution. The third Part will introduce the concept of a two-level 
game where the President is bargaining with other nations and 
Congress over trade policy. Drawing on a two-level game frame-
work, this Part will examine how WTO dispute resolution alters 
domestic bargaining and will discuss three WTO cases. The WTO 
procedure effectively creates an international constraint on the ex-
ecutive in domestic bargaining, which aids the President in negotia-
tions with legislators. The fourth Part of this Essay will address 
why Congress accepts changes in the WTO system. The Conclusion 
will discuss how this study changes our view of international law. 
States’ preferences for a rule-based system of international law can 
turn on how domestic policy decisions are made and how interna-
tional law can change domestic politics. 
I. THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The WTO system of dispute resolution, labeled the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding (“DSU”), developed out of the panel sys-
tem of the GATT. Comprehensive discussions of the changes be-
tween the GATT and WTO systems are readily available 
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elsewhere, so this section focuses on how the developments altered 
bargaining between states.2
Members of the GATT (“contracting parties” in GATT terms) 
traditionally acted by consensus. Although this system worked for 
rounds of negotiation, where contracting parties could offer bene-
fits in turn for concessions, it did not work as well in dispute resolu-
tion.3 If a state violated the terms of the GATT, injured states 
could protest and request the formation of a dispute resolution 
panel to hear the merits of the dispute. Under the consensus rule, 
however, the findings of the panel had to be adopted by all of the 
contracting parties. This effectively gave every government, includ-
ing the losing government, a veto over panel determinations until 
1989.4 Contracting parties allowed panels to proceed, but could 
2 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (2d ed. 1997); David Palmeter & 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (1999); 
William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Ill. Pub. L. Res. Paper 
No. 03–08, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=419943. 
3 The GATT system did not provide explicitly for dispute resolution; rather, the 
panel system developed by default. See Hudec, supra note 1, at 102–03. The GATT 
was not intended to be the foundational agreement for the world trading system. In-
stead, the contracting parties to the original 1947 GATT agreement set out the insti-
tutional structure of the trading system in the International Trade Organization 
(“ITO”) agreement, negotiated between 1946 and 1948, which provided for a formal 
dispute resolution procedure. The GATT was simply an interim measure to reduce 
barriers to trade while the ITO agreement was negotiated. Palmeter & Mavroidis, su-
pra note 2, at 3. The ITO, however, was never ratified by the United States and the 
GATT became the foundational agreement in the ITO’s absence. See Jackson, supra 
note 2, at 37–38, 112–14; Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 2, at 1–7; see also Robert 
E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (2d ed. 1990). 
4 Governments could block the GATT dispute resolution system in four ways: by 
blocking the formation of a panel, refusing to select members of the panel, refusing to 
adopt the panel report, or blocking the authorization of sanctions. See Davey, supra 
note 2, at 8. Successive rounds of GATT negotiations further developed the process 
of dispute resolution. In the 1979 Tokyo Round, the contracting parties formalized 
the panel procedure, although any government could still block the formation of a 
panel or the panel report. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 116–17; Palmeter & Mav-
roidis, supra note 2, at 7–11. The 1989 Montreal Rules, negotiated as a set of interim 
rules during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986–93), limited the parties’ ability to 
block the formation of a panel or the adoption of the panel’s report. These measures 
were incorporated into the final Uruguay Round Agreement. See Palmeter & Mav-
roidis, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
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block panel decisions or drag out implementation of the decision 
for three or more years.5
Without a well-functioning legal system, trade disputes were of-
ten resolved by negotiations between the interested parties, rather 
than decided on the merits of the case. Although the GATT re-
gime did not have centralized enforcement, economically powerful 
governments monitored and enforced their interpretations of trade 
law by imposing sanctions on perceived violators.6 Most notably, 
the U.S. government unilaterally threatened sanctions to remedy 
what it perceived as unfair trading practices.7 By statute, Congress 
authorized (and attempted to require) the President to raise tariff 
rates against foreign nations that he determined were either violat-
ing international trade law (Section 301 sanctions) or failing to re-
spect intellectual property rights (Special 301 sanctions).8 Although 
the decentralized enforcement of trade rules was arguably a viola-
tion of existing GATT law, unilateral sanctioning was both com-
mon and perceived as necessary given the weakness of the GATT 
dispute resolution system. 
The bargaining context of the GATT system can be roughly 
characterized as a power-based system.9 The GATT system could 
not effectively resolve government complaints, so disputes were in-
stead addressed through government-to-government negotiation. 
The outcome of these negotiations could be based on many factors, 
including the relationship between the two states (including non-
5 See A. Jane Bradley, Implementing the Results of GATT Panel Proceedings: An 
Area for Uruguay Round Consideration, in The New GATT Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 345, 349 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988). 
6 See Robert E. Hudec, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: The Concept of Fairness in U.S. 
Foreign Trade Policy, reprinted in Robert E. Hudec, Essays on the Nature of Interna-
tional Trade Law 227, 227 (1999). 
7 See generally Thomas O. Bayard & Kimberly Ann Elliott, Reciprocity and Re-
taliation in U.S. Trade Policy (1994); Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An 
Overview, in Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World 
Trading System 1 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter Ag-
gressive Unilateralism]. 
8 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–20 (2000); see Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilat-
eralism, supra note 7, at 1–6. 
9 Professor Jackson uses the dichotomy between rule- and power-based systems to 
describe changes in the international trading system. See Jackson, supra note 2, 109–
12. 
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economic relations) and the relative importance of each state’s 
home market to the other’s exporters. 
The WTO system was an attempt to centralize dispute settle-
ment. Rather than having individual states both make their own 
determinations of trade law violations and enforce those determi-
nations, the WTO system adopted a two-part approach. First, it 
ended the de facto veto over panel decisions and employed a re-
verse-consensus rule: The panel decision would be accepted unless 
every contracting member voted to reject the panel’s determina-
tion. Because panel decisions would now be very hard to overturn, 
the WTO system incorporated an appellate procedure to check 
panel decision-making.10 The system is designed to adjudicate all 
cases, including appeals, within sixteen months.11
Second, the WTO attempted to end decentralized enforcement 
of trade rules. Under the new system, states cannot employ sanc-
tions for violations of trade rules unless authorized to do so by the 
WTO. The use of unilateral sanctions was also prohibited under 
the GATT system, but the rule was ignored because other means 
of enforcement were effectively unavailable. Under WTO rules, 
there is no longer a justification for using unilateral sanctions, and 
the rule banning decentralized enforcement is the foundation of 
the new system.12
When a defendant government fails to comply with a panel rul-
ing, the parties must negotiate a compensatory solution—namely, 
compensation or the withdrawal of trade benefits to the defendant 
state. Under WTO rules, the level of compensation should be 
10 But who watches the watchman? See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of 
International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping 
Decisions, 34 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 109, 112–13 (2002) (arguing the appellate body is 
not following WTO dumping rules); see also Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and 
Legal Unification—The Agency Problem, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 333, 336–38 (2002) 
(discussing the agency costs of international adjudication). 
11 This timeline was negotiated at the insistence of the United States to keep WTO 
dispute resolution within the time frame for imposing Section 301 sanctions. If the 
DSU system took longer than sixteen months, then federal law could require the 
President to impose sanctions for alleged violations of international trade law before 
the WTO had ruled. See Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411, 2414 (2000). 
12 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
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roughly equal to the present injury from the violation; compensa-
tion is not available for injury that occurs while the complaint is be-
ing adjudicated.13 If the parties fail to reach an agreement on com-
pensation, the issue is referred to an arbitration panel that 
determines the maximum level of sanctions.14 The rules are thus 
designed to take the power to authorize sanctions out of the hands 
of individual states. For instance, the United States’ use of sanc-
tions—the so-called Section 301 sanctions—is not permitted under 
the WTO system unless a panel authorizes the sanctions and the 
sanctions are within the limits set by arbitration.15
In practice, the WTO system of dispute resolution retains as-
pects of a negotiation system. If there is an alleged violation of 
trade rules, injured parties may request a panel to determine the 
merits of the dispute. The parties are obligated to attempt to reach 
a negotiated solution before the panel ruling, but the defendant 
government cannot block the eventual formation of a panel. If a 
panel is formed, the panel’s ruling is adopted unless all of the con-
tracting parties reject the decision. The decision is subject to appel-
late review. Even at this stage, the system involves negotiation. In 
practice, the parties can reach a settlement that does not comply 
with the letter of the panel’s ruling, just as parties in domestic cases 
can settle for less than the judgment. 
The economic power of the parties remains important because 
governments must still resort to self-help mechanisms—limiting na-
tional market access—to enforce WTO decisions. Consequently, 
governments that have large import markets have greater eco-
nomic power to sanction violators. Governments with large inter-
nal markets, such as the United States and the European Union, 
have the capacity to “enforce” judgment awards. By contrast, gov-
ernments with smaller home markets, such as Costa Rica or Thai-
land, may not have the capacity to enforce an award.16 The ultimate 
13 DSU, supra note 12, art. 22.4; see also Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 2, at 
168–71. 
14 DSU, supra note 12, arts. 22.6 & 22.7. For a clear description of DSU sanctioning 
procedures, see Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 2, at 168–71. 
15 See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
16 The complaining state may find that the level of sanctions they can threaten is too 
low to bother to apply sanctions at all. For example, under the GATT system the 
Netherlands was authorized, but never did impose sanctions on the United States in 
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negotiated solution to trade disputes thus may depend on the eco-
nomic power of the complaining government.17 For instance, a ne-
gotiated settlement between the European Union and the United 
States will be much closer to the panel ruling than a negotiated set-
tlement between Thailand and the United States. The European 
Union’s market is larger than Thailand’s and thus the European 
Union has a greater capacity to sanction the United States by re-
stricting access to its market. The United States would therefore 
likely be willing to make greater concessions to the European Un-
ion than Thailand after an adverse panel ruling. 
Nonetheless, the revised WTO system is a break from past prac-
tice that alters the nature of trade policy bargaining. Governments 
have ceded decision-making power over definition of the substan-
tive treaty rules to a third party arbitrator. Parties are bound to 
WTO findings of trade rule violations. Additionally, a complainant 
government cannot threaten sanctions if the WTO panel finds that 
no violation has occurred. For instance, the United States govern-
ment’s ability to pressure the Japanese government into modifying 
the structure of its film market was significantly curtailed once the 
panel found in favor of Japan.18
Together, these structural changes in dispute resolution have 
changed trade law within the United States in two ways: They have 
made temporary violations of trade agreements easier but perma-
nent violations more costly. First, temporary violations are easier 
because the contracting parties have agreed to refrain from retalia-
tory sanctions until the complaint has been adjudicated at the 
WTO. If the WTO finds that a violation has occurred, then the 
compensatory sanctions can only be applied for injury caused after 
the panel has ruled. Governments can thus apply protection in vio-
response to trade barriers on dairy products. See Netherlands Measures of Suspen-
sion of Obligations to the United States (Nov. 8, 1952) GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 
32 (1953); see also Jackson, supra note 2, at 116; Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 2, 
at 168. 
17 Several trade scholars have presented proposals to change the remedy stage to 
equalize power between states. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Counter-
measures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 
Am. J. Int’l L. 335, 342–45 (2000) (arguing that states not injured by trade violations 
should be permitted to adopt sanctions to enforce WTO judgments). 
18 See Report of the Panel, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic 
Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, at 488–89 (Mar. 31, 1998). 
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lation of trade rules until the international litigation is complete 
(approximately sixteen months) without penalty. 
Second, the WTO system has made permanent violations of the 
trade agreement more costly because sanctions are more certain. 
The threat of counter-retaliation or delay was ever present under 
the GATT.19 Either the complaining government waited until the 
international litigation was completed (in which case the defendant 
government could delay the panel report or implementation of the 
decision for years20), or it applied sanctions unilaterally. Unilateral 
sanctions were also violations of the trade agreement, however, 
and the defendant state could threaten counter-retaliation. This 
threat was particularly effective for economically powerful defen-
dant states that could block market access to complaining states. 
The WTO eliminates these problems by putting the contracting 
parties on a stricter timeline and authorizing specific levels of sanc-
tions. Sanctions are thereby legitimized, while unilateral counter-
retaliation is not. Although the WTO effectively permits tempo-
rary violations and limits the degree to which complaining states 
can sanction violators, the system raises the costs of permanent vio-
lations. Governments are regularly authorized to apply sanctions 
against violators, and economically powerful governments cannot 
use the threat of counter-retaliation to forestall these penalties.21 
By centralizing the authority to use sanctions, the WTO system in-
creases enforcement by making threats of sanctions more credible. 
The WTO changes the bargaining position of the United States 
in negotiations over trade law compliance. The rule-based system 
increases enforcement of trade law against U.S. trade practices; 
curtailing the use of defensive sanctions adds credibility to the for-
eign threats of sanctions. The United States’ offensive use of sanc-
19 See Stewart & Callahan, supra note 1, at 12. 
20 Under the GATT system, panel reports could be blocked and respondent gov-
ernments could maintain that their trade practices were consistent with international 
obligations. See Robert E. Hudec, “Transcending the Ostensible”: Some Reflections 
on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, reprinted in Essays on the Nature 
of International Trade Law, supra note 6, at 117, 120 (noting that in the late 1970s, the 
European Union began blocking adverse decisions against it; the United States en-
gaged in similar actions to block). 
21 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading Sys-
tem 54 (2002); Jackson, supra note 2, at 124–27; see also Michael J. Trebilcock & 
Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 54–60 (2d ed. 1999). 
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tions is also constrained. The WTO system restricts the use of sanc-
tions absent a finding of violation by a panel. Consequently, the 
United States’ ability to unilaterally determine if its trading part-
ners are violating trade rules is limited. 
II. CURRENT EXPLANATIONS OF U.S. STRATEGY 
The United States government’s decision to champion the WTO 
system of rule-based dispute resolution is puzzling when consid-
ered against the alternative of power-based bargaining. Under the 
GATT regime, the United States could challenge the trading prac-
tices of other states while shielding its own laws from similar at-
tacks. Although the GATT system prohibited unilateral retaliation, 
states regularly engaged in unilateral action because of the GATT 
institutions’ inability to enforce trade rules effectively. It thus 
seems odd that the United States government would press the issue 
of rule-based dispute resolution. Other governments, who would 
presumably benefit from greater enforcement of trade rules against 
the United States, were also reluctant to embrace a rule-based sys-
tem. The European Community and the Japanese government re-
sisted this system, as did many American legislators. Current inter-
national law theories of dispute resolution provide unsatisfactory 
explanations for why the United States pressed for a rule-based 
dispute resolution system. Most accounts from international law 
focus on government-to-government negotiations, but ignore do-
mestic bargaining over trade policy. 
An exception to this trend is the argument, advanced by Profes-
sors Alan Sykes and Warren Schwartz, that governments sup-
ported the new WTO structure as a means to permit more defec-
tions to the agreement—the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
was designed to permit efficient breaches of the WTO contract.22 
Using a political economy sense of efficiency, they argue that the 
problem with the GATT was not compliance, but over-deterrence: 
Governments could threaten to sanction defections and thus pre-
22 See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotia-
tion and Dispute Resolution in The World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. 
S179, S182–92 (2002). Professor Peter Rosendorff makes the same argument in more 
formal terms. See B. Peter Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 389, 390 (2005). 
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vent governments from violating the agreement even when the vio-
lator would be willing to pay adequate compensation. They main-
tain that the only real change accomplished in the WTO structure 
is a limit on injured states’ sanctioning ability.23 Consequently, the 
WTO system was designed to limit punishment of violators and al-
low more defection rather than less. 
Schwartz and Sykes provide a satisfying explanation for why 
sanctions in the WTO system are limited to those that compensate, 
and not deter, breach. Their account, however, does not provide an 
answer to why the United States government supported the WTO. 
The United States should have been able to efficiently breach the 
substantive economic contract regardless of the WTO procedure 
by negotiating informal side payments. Over-deterrence is only a 
problem for relatively small-market states where the sanctions 
from large-market states might eliminate opportunities for politi-
cally beneficial deals. Given the size of the United States market 
relative to the size of other possible sanctioning government’s 
markets, it is unlikely that the United States government needed 
the WTO to facilitate efficient breaches.24
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: DOMESTIC  
BARGAINING POWER 
Professor Robert Hudec suggests that the European Union fi-
nally overcame its reluctance to consent to rule-based dispute reso-
lution as a way to constrain the U.S. Congress.25 At the time of the 
Uruguay Round negotiation, Congress was undertaking domestic 
legislation which would further require the President to impose 
sanctions when domestic agencies concluded that other govern-
ments had violated trade laws. European nations viewed the WTO 
23 “[C]onsider the question of what really changes under the new DSU. . . . The pri-
mary difference is that [sanctioning] measures can now be reviewed by a binding arbi-
tral panel for excessiveness before they can be put into place, whereas before they 
were unilaterally announced and implemented without review by the GATT.” 
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 22, at S203. 
24 Professor Sykes discusses how contracting parties could make such politically effi-
cient breaches under GATT rules. See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safe-
guard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Specula-
tions, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 278–83 (1991). 
25 See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Over-
view of the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 13–14 (1999). 
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as a way to neutralize the American use of unilateral sanctions. 
Hudec’s explanation helps us understand why other governments 
conceded to the U.S. request for rule-based dispute resolution, but 
it does not explain why the United States itself wanted a system of 
rules rather than a system of negotiation. 
The President, I will argue, had reasons similar to those of our 
trading partners to push for a rule-based dispute resolution mecha-
nism. By placing an international constraint on the President, the 
WTO improves the President’s bargaining power with Congress. 
Binding international procedures, which the executive can negoti-
ate, limit the ability of Congress to impose its own rules on the 
conduct of trade policy in the domestic policy sphere. While rule-
based dispute resolution limits the ability of the United States to 
use its economic power internationally, the WTO system increases 
the relative power of the executive over substantive trade law. The 
U.S. government’s outward preference for binding dispute resolu-
tion is thus best understood by considering the domestic politics of 
trade policy. 
To demonstrate this argument, I present a bargaining framework 
where the President is engaging in both international and domestic 
negotiations. Professor Robert Putnam has described this frame-
work as a two-level game.26 Government representatives must 
reach an agreement in international negotiations that can be rati-
fied at home. Putnam argues that the domestic-level game affects 
international bargaining by serving as a credible constraint. Diplo-
mats can effectively refuse to make concessions if the other gov-
ernment’s representatives believe that the concessions would be 
politically unacceptable at home. The reverse is also true: Changes 
in the international system can alter the way that issues are consid-
ered in domestic politics and influence the bargaining dynamics at 
home.27
26 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 434 (1988). 
27 Dan Drezner has recently edited a volume on this effect. See Daniel W. Drezner, 
Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions, in Locating 
the Proper Authorities 2 (Daniel W. Drezner ed., 2003); Duncan Snidal & Alexander 
Thompson, International Commitments and Domestic Politics: Institutions and Ac-
tors at Two Levels, in Locating the Proper Authorities, supra, at 197. 
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A. The Two-Level Game Framework 
Constraints can increase a party’s bargaining power. This con-
clusion at first seems counterintuitive: The party with the most 
flexibility in negotiations would appear to have an advantage be-
cause it has more options. Yet constraints may prove beneficial by 
lending credibility to a party’s negotiating position.28 For instance, 
governments often must have legislatures ratify any agreement 
reached in international negotiations. If Government A is known 
to have a legislature that will not ratify any agreement that includes 
a particular concession, then Government A’s refusal to grant that 
concession will be credible in international negotiations. Govern-
ment B will not ask for the concession when the domestic con-
straint exists, even if it would have pressed for the concession oth-
erwise. Of course, strong constraints can also be detrimental to 
concluding agreements if the constraints stop the parties from 
reaching any agreement at all. Agreement may be impossible if the 
two parties have legislatures that will not ratify any accord that 
does not give the largest share of the gains to their side.29
In a two-level game, an agreement must be acceptable on both 
the international and domestic levels, but the levels are not analyti-
cally separate. Restrictions on either level influence the bargaining 
on the other level by imposing credible constraints. Extending this 
logic, other bargaining theorists have sought to determine when 
governments will create domestic constraints to improve their in-
ternational bargaining power. Professor Jongryn Mo provides a 
28 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 19 (1960). Two-level games are now 
a standard framework for understanding international negotiations. See, e.g., Keisuke 
Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?, 37 J. Conflict Resol. 403, 
403–05 (1993); Jongryn Mo, The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Do-
mestic Coalitions, 38 J. Conflict Resol. 402, 402–06 (1994); Andrew Moravscik, Inte-
grating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, in Double-
Edged Diplomacy 3, 4–5, 33 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993). 
29 See Putnam, supra note 26, at 433–41. The impasse could be caused by different 
bargaining problems. First, the legislatures of each state prefer no agreement to an 
agreement for something less than they are demanding. Here, the win set is empty 
and negotiations only take place because the governments have incomplete informa-
tion about the other government’s preferences. Second, the bargaining may break 
down over distributional concerns. Here, the governments leave possible gains on the 
table in the hope of receiving a larger share of the gains in later negotiations. See 
James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 Int’l 
Org. 269, 280–93 (1998). 
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model whereby a government chooses whether to grant veto power 
over international bargains to a domestic group. The model dem-
onstrates that a government can increase its bargaining power with 
the foreign state by creating a domestic veto player.30
International constraints can benefit the constrained party in 
domestic bargaining, just as domestic constraints can aid interna-
tional bargaining. When bargaining with Congress, the President 
frequently has international constraints that add credibility to his 
position. Members of Congress understand that if they do not ac-
cept the policy negotiated by the President, then agreement at the 
international level may not be possible.31 If the President did not 
have an international constraint, then members of Congress could 
bargain with the President and move the resulting policy closer to 
their preferred outcome. Consequently, the President is often 
aided, not hampered, by having an international constraint that 
makes his bargaining position more credible at the domestic level. 
For instance, Professor Judith Goldstein demonstrates that the 
President can use international agreements to limit Congressional 
oversight of bureaucratic adjudication of trade remedy laws,32 Pro-
fessor Keisuke Iida discusses how WTO adjudication influences 
bureaucratic politics in Japan,33 and Professor James Vreeland pre-
30 See Jongryn Mo, Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of 
Agent Veto in Two-Level Games, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 914, 914–15 (1995). If the 
foreign government has complete information over the home government’s prefer-
ences, Mo predicts that the home government will always want an agent with veto 
power. If the foreign government has incomplete information, he predicts that the 
home government will grant the agent veto power if the agent’s preferences are close 
to those of the government. Id. at 916–21. 
31 To aid international bargaining, members of Congress will occasionally promise 
not to negotiate with the President over international policies by pre-committing to 
either accepting the President’s position wholesale or staying with the status quo. On 
trade issues, this promise is known as fast-track negotiations. 
32 See Judith Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling 
North American “Unfair” Trade Laws, 50 Int’l Org. 541, 556–60 (1996). Under the 
Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (later expanded to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement), disputes over the application of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties laws can be appealed to a bi-national panel. The panel applies national law, not 
international law, yet is free from Congressional oversight. Goldstein argues that the 
President accepted this Canadian negotiating demand as a means to gain greater con-
trol over his own bureaucracy. Id. at 544–46, 556–57. 
33 See Keisuke Iida, Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? 
The Puzzle of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication, 23 J. Pub. 
Pol’y 1, 8–10 (2003). 
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sents evidence that executives with strong domestic opposition of-
ten turn to the IMF to enact domestic changes.34
But why create an international body to constrain domestic 
trade policy? The President has different trade preferences than 
Congress, and the international constraint grants the President 
greater control over domestic trade policy. In the two-level trade 
game, the President negotiates with foreign governments and Con-
gress concurrently. The President has different trade preferences 
than Congress but does not necessarily prefer complete compliance 
with the free trade agreement. All elected officials support the 
economic growth that freer trade policies produce, but they are 
sensitive to adverse effects that trade liberalization can bring: Leg-
islators do not want industries in their district to face increased for-
eign competition, and the President is similarly concerned with 
protecting key electoral interests. Consequently, the President and 
members of Congress will prefer trade policies that mix freer trade 
and protection, but they will not prefer the same mix of these poli-
cies.35
First, the President and members of the Senate represent differ-
ent constituencies. The President wants to promote economic 
growth nationally, while senators are re-elected based on the eco-
nomic growth of their respective states.36 Consequently, the Senate, 
as a collective body, will give much greater weight to the economic 
well-being of sparsely populated states than the President will. Cer-
34 See James Raymond Vreeland, Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements 1–
5 (Feb. 6, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation). 
35 The political science literature on President and Congressional trade preferences 
is vast, including: I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics (4th ed. 2005); Michael J. Gil-
ligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in 
American Trade Policy (1997); David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: 
International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939 (1988); Sharyn 
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy (1994); Michael A. Bailey 
et al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and In-
ternational Trade, 49 World Politics 309 (1997); Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? 
The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization, 53 Int’l Org. 669 (1999); 
David Karol, Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, 54 Int’l Org. 825 (2000); Peter J. Katzenstein, Conclusion: Domestic Structures 
and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy, 31 Int’l Org. 879 (1977); Susanne Loh-
mann & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and 
Evidence, 48 Int’l Org. 595 (1994). 
36 See O’Halloran, supra note 35, at 36. 
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tainly, the economic health of key states will concern the President, 
but he is best able to maximize his electoral support by producing 
economic growth in more densely populated states. In addition, the 
economic base in sparsely populated and densely populated states 
differs—sparsely populated states are far more dependent on agri-
culture, an industry in which the United States generally does not 
have a comparative advantage. The result is that the trade policy 
that maximizes the President’s electoral support will not be the 
same policy that maximizes electoral support in the Senate. 
Second, the process for devising trade policy differs between the 
President and Congress. The executive branch works as a hierar-
chy, making it relatively easy for the President to devise a trade 
policy that maximizes his electoral support by liberalizing trade 
while offering protection to key constituencies.37 By contrast, 
members of Congress must devise a trade policy that can garner a 
legislative majority but protect the districts of senior legislators 
who have agenda-setting and gatekeeping authority. Again, the 
President’s preferred trade policy may differ substantially from the 
one Congress would select. The President may be willing to sacri-
fice industries that are dear to senior legislators, and vice versa. 
Between the President and Congress there will be a range of 
trade policies that are acceptable, meaning that both the President 
and a majority of Congress will prefer the new policy to the status 
quo. Which policy is selected depends on who has agenda-setting 
power. The President has this power when bargaining internation-
ally, but loses it in the statutory lawmaking process. The WTO aids 
the President in keeping trade policy closer to his preferences by 
making Congressional deviations from the trade agreement more 
costly. 
The WTO permits the President and Congress to temporarily 
provide protection to favored industries, but it makes permanent 
defections more costly. This system increases the President’s con-
trol over trade policy in two ways. First, the system allows the 
President to provide temporary protection to key groups more eas-
ily than members of Congress. The President can provide protec-
37 See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Con-
gress, 53 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2006) (manuscript at 23–24, on file with 
author). 
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tion, in the form of administrative safeguard actions, through ex-
ecutive order, while Congress has to pass a statute. Consequently, 
the President can target specific groups quickly, while members of 
Congress have to build majority support for trade protection (mak-
ing it difficult to keep the number of groups provided with protec-
tion small) and find space on the legislative agenda. 
Second, the WTO system helps the President’s trade preferences 
stick in domestic politics. The President negotiates international 
agreements, allowing him to move trade policy closer to his pre-
ferred mix of trade protection and liberalization. Members of Con-
gress can violate the trade agreement ex post, through ordinary 
statutory lawmaking, just as they could under the GATT system. 
Under the WTO system, however, legislative rollback of the inter-
national agreement is more costly. 
The WTO system also makes permanent violations of the trade 
agreement more costly for the President. The President can miti-
gate these increased costs, however, because he has access to ongo-
ing multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO dispute resolution 
system simply enforces the terms negotiated by the parties.38 Con-
sequently, the President can address adverse panel rulings during 
trade negotiations while members of Congress cannot. 
If Congress loses bargaining power over trade policy relative to 
the President under this system, the question then is why Congress 
would approve the Uruguay Round Agreement that ushered in the 
WTO. The President’s motives for gaining bargaining power seem 
clear, but Congress’s motives in approving the WTO system are 
less obvious. The answer lies in the President’s power over the con-
tent of international deals. The WTO’s dispute resolution proce-
dures were part of a package of trade negotiations included in the 
Uruguay Round. Congress had to accept the entire package to gain 
the benefits of the trade agreement, including intellectual property 
protections. As Part IV of this Essay will demonstrate in more de-
tail, members of Congress did object to the WTO dispute resolu-
38 Even principles fundamental to the international trade system, such as non-
discrimination of goods based on national origin, can be violated if approved by the 
contracting parties. For example, regional trade agreements lead to discrimination of 
goods based on national origin. Yet this violation of a fundamental rule of the WTO 
is permitted because the contracting parties included an exception for such agree-
ments in the trade agreement. 
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tion procedures during ratification and attempted to limit the pro-
cedures’ effects, but they were ultimately unsuccessful. 
B. Negotiating Compliance with Congress 
1. U.S. Violations of Trade Agreements 
The WTO is most useful when the President negotiates with 
Congress over domestic law, so developing a clear conception of 
how the United States violates trade agreements is critical. The 
United States can defect from an agreement in one of three ways: 
the President can act unilaterally; Congress can pass a statute that 
the President does not veto; or existing domestic law can be found 
to be in violation. This Essay addresses the latter two situations, 
but it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the implications of unilateral 
action on the part of the President. 
The President can decide, on his own, to violate the terms of 
trade agreements because administrative decisions regarding either 
tariff levels or the application of trade remedy law are both within 
his discretion.39 Because the President has different trade prefer-
ences than Congress, he may choose to violate a trade agreement 
when members of Congress would not. 
When the President violates trade agreements, he most often 
uses safeguard actions granting temporary protection for industries 
injured by unforeseen surges in imports.40 The WTO explicitly 
permits such protection on a temporary basis when safeguard re-
quirements41 are met, but it also permits, albeit de facto, temporary 
safeguard protection even when the requirements are not met. Be-
cause damages are only assessed after the DSU finds a government 
in violation of trade law, the President can temporarily impose 
safeguard protection without penalty until the issuance of the DSU 
ruling. Consequently, the WTO system curtails the President’s 
power to grant permanent protection, but permits temporary pro-
tection to key constituencies. 
39 See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 201, 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2411 (2000). 
40 Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000). 
41 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, A-58–59, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 258–60 (requiring unforeseen developments that cause 
or threaten serious injury to domestic producers as prerequisites for protection). 
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President Bush’s decision in 2002 to raise the duties on steel im-
ports is one example. Higher tariffs on steel benefited key electoral 
constituencies in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. The steel tariffs 
were temporary: President Bush maintained the tariffs for twenty 
months and then removed them once the WTO found the action to 
be a violation of trade law.42 Under the WTO, the President is more 
likely to face sanctions for longer-term violations of trade law. But 
the President controls negotiations over the content of trade 
agreements and can attempt, during negotiations, to include pro-
tection in the terms of an agreement. 
The second way the United States can violate a trade agreement 
is when Congress passes legislation knowing it conflicts with exist-
ing trade agreement terms. The President can veto or sign such leg-
islation, but often, the offending part of the bill is a relatively mi-
nor part of the overall legislative package. For instance, the bill 
may address multiple domestic environmental issues, only one of 
which creates international trade problems. Or the bill may contain 
an amendment, unrelated to the rest of the legislative package, that 
violates the terms of a trade agreement. In both situations, the 
President may choose not to veto the legislation despite the viola-
tion of trade law. The President’s veto power is limited because he 
cannot apply it delicately. The President must reject the entire leg-
islative package, which may otherwise bring him significant domes-
tic benefits, to eliminate a single provision that will cause an inter-
national problem. Because Congress understands this dilemma, the 
President’s threats to veto trade legislation are often viewed as not 
credible.43
42 Rossella Brevetti & Christopher S. Rugaber, Bush Ends Steel Safeguard Tariffs in 
Face of Threat by EU to Retaliate, WTO Rep. (BNA) Dec. 5, 2003 (on file with au-
thor).
43 Before the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, the Presi-
dent only explicitly threatened to veto tariff schedules in 1894, 1909, and 1930, but 
Congress ignored these threats. See Lake, supra note 35, at 84–85 (1988). When Con-
gress defects from a trade agreement through legislative amendment, there is a differ-
ence between a state’s decision to defect in the prisoner’s dilemma game—the stan-
dard framework for understanding defection from trade agreements—and the reality 
of American non-compliance. The prisoner’s dilemma game assumes that the decision 
to defect is made under the same process as the decision to create the agreement. But 
in the complexity of domestic politics, a different dynamic takes place. When forming 
the agreement, the President has agenda control and the Congress has a veto. When 
Congress violates the treaty through statute, however, Congress determines the con-
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President Clinton’s refusal to veto the bill that contained the 
Byrd Amendment—creating a change to anti-dumping law that 
violates international law—is one such instance. The bill submitted 
to the President for signature concerned agriculture appropria-
tions. Senator Byrd attached an amendment knowing it would vio-
late international trade law, but also knowing that the bill was too 
politically important for the president to veto. The senator calcu-
lated correctly. President Clinton openly opposed the Byrd 
Amendment on international law grounds but was unwilling to 
take the political heat that would come from blocking the entire 
bill.44
Rather than vetoing a multiple-issue legislative package, the 
President can choose to slice off the single offending issue at a later 
date. In this situation, the President is left to negotiate with Con-
gress over existing legislation. The President pays a cost for this 
choice; he loses any veto power because the legislation already ex-
ists, and he must get a majority of Congress to reverse the earlier 
rule. 
The President gains greater agenda control of trade policy be-
cause the international agreement is harder to violate, not because 
he actively controls the domestic compliance process ex post. 
Through the WTO, the President keeps agenda control of trade 
policy by making violations of the trade agreement more costly. 
This power is not formal: Legislators must balance the costs of 
WTO sanctions with the benefits of keeping provisions of domestic 
law that deviate from the trade agreement without any active par-
ticipation by the executive. The President can be politically passive 
through this process, allowing the threat of sanctions to do the co-
ercive work. For example, the President did not have to use politi-
cal capital to motivate legislators to repeal the Byrd Amendment. 
To members of Congress, the primary difference between the 
two regimes is the certainty of sanctions. Under the GATT system, 
tent of the law and the President has only a veto. This shift in power between the po-
litical branches means that the government may defect from more agreements than it 
would if the President had agenda control, as he does when negotiating the trade 
agreement. 
44 See Rossella Brevetti, EU, Canada, and Japan Weigh In Against Dumping Meas-
ures in Ag Bill, WTO Rep. (BNA) Oct. 27, 2000 (on file with author); Corbett B. 
Daly, Japan Foreign Minister Urges Clinton Veto Of Bill Sending Duty Revenue to 
Industry, WTO Rep. (BNA) Oct. 20, 2000 (on file with author). 
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legislators could violate trade rules but be relatively confident that 
the costs of such actions were low. If another member of the 
GATT threatened to sanction the United States, legislators knew 
that the United States could threaten counter-retaliation in re-
sponse.45 The threat of counter-retaliation, particularly from the 
United States, could deter most retaliation, insulating legislators 
from the costs of their decisions. Under the WTO system, legisla-
tors cannot threaten counter-retaliation because the WTO system 
bars unilateral action, by either plaintiff or defendant governments. 
Without the threat of counter-retaliation, WTO-authorized sanc-
tions are far more likely to be applied, and legislators bear more of 
the costs of trade violations. 
Finally, a state may not “decide” to violate a trade agreement, 
but rather discover that domestic laws that pre-date the interna-
tional agreement are not consistent with international trade rules. 
When trade agreements dealt primarily with tariff levels, compli-
ance with the trade agreement was relatively transparent. States 
could disagree about whether some goods fit into product classifi-
cations, but it was easy to observe whether national tariff schedules 
matched the internationally negotiated schedules. 
As trade agreements expand to non-tariff barriers to trade, de-
termining whether the state is complying becomes more complex.46 
International rules apply to a wide range of domestic laws, not just 
tariff schedules. Some of these laws may violate the trade agree-
ment on their face, but others may violate the agreement only in 
application. In addition, whether the domestic statute violates 
trade law is often a point of disagreement. The state might have 
understood its own law to be in compliance in earlier periods, but 
later might accept that a violation exists.47 A state can thus be said 
45 Although unilateral sanctions were technically a violation of GATT rules, the in-
ability of GATT institutions to authorize sanctions made unilateral threats to sanction 
the only viable means of enforcing trade law. By contrast, WTO institutions are capa-
ble of reaching multilateral decisions on when trade law has been violated and can 
also authorize sanctions. Member governments can no longer justify unilateral sanc-
tions as a necessary element of enforcing trade law. See supra Part I. 
46 See Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements 
and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 551, 598. 
47 If the government actors are boundedly rational, they may also not exhaustively 
search current law to look for inconsistencies and thus be genuinely surprised by the 
violation. 
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to defect from an agreement due to long-standing domestic laws or 
domestic initiatives not primarily aimed at trade. Although the 
President had veto power when the statute was passed, by the time 
he negotiates with Congress to comply with trade agreements, he 
no longer has veto power over the offending legislation. 
The consequence is that the President often bargains with Con-
gress to change existing domestic law in the latter two situations. 
Without the WTO, compliance in this scenario is difficult to 
achieve domestically. The President has the exclusive constitu-
tional authority to negotiate trade agreements (or any other inter-
national agreement) on behalf of the nation,48 while Congress has 
jurisdiction to set tariff levels and pass domestic regulations that in-
fluence international trade.49 Without international bargaining over 
trade policy issues, the President’s role in determining trade law is 
restricted to the veto. The President does not even have the veto 
threat when negotiating with Congress over existing statutes that 
violate trade law. The WTO shifts trade policy power towards the 
President by making such deviations from the trade agreement 
more costly to legislators. 
2. Examples of the WTO’s Effect on Domestic Law 
In the time since the passage of the WTO agreement, the United 
States has changed its domestic law to comply with international 
rulings. Most notably, the United States altered its tax system re-
garding export subsidies. The European Union (“EU”)50 had long 
claimed that the United States gave its exporters special breaks by 
exempting from income tax large portions of overseas sales.51 The 
United States maintained that it was simply leveling the playing 
field between exporters because European nations used a territo-
rial tax system that had a similar effect.52
48 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
49 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
50 During different periods of GATT and WTO history, the common market of 
European States has developed from the European Coal and Steel Community to the 
European Economic Community to the European Community to the European Un-
ion. To simplify the exposition, I use the common market’s current name, the Euro-
pean Union, to refer to all of these organizations. 
51 See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the 
Modern GATT Legal System 59–65 (1993). 
52 Id. at 63. 
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Resolution of the issue had a long and largely unsuccessful his-
tory under the GATT. A GATT panel found that the United 
States violated trade law, but also found that certain European tax 
systems violated trade rules as well. After many years of negotia-
tion, the contracting parties adopted a compromise interpretation 
of GATT law that permitted territorial tax systems. The United 
States used this interpretation to defend its tax code against the ob-
jections of the GATT membership.53 The trade dispute dragged on 
for twelve years (the panel process took four years to complete and 
the contracting parties did not achieve a compromise for another 
eight years) and produced no significant changes. The United 
States ultimately passed new tax legislation but the legislation pri-
marily changed the form, not the substance, of the export subsidy.54
After the WTO system was in place, the European Union de-
cided to bring the case again. In 2000, the appellate body affirmed 
a panel judgment for the EU, and a panel later authorized the 
Europeans to impose $4 billion in sanctions.55 This time the U.S. 
bargaining position was different because the United States could 
neither block the panel report nor threaten counter-retaliation. 
Exporters, who were likely to be hit by the sanctions, viewed the 
threat of sanctions as credible and responded accordingly.56 Com-
panies as diverse as Motorola, International Paper, General Elec-
53 Id. at 86–95. 
54 Id. at 95–97. 
55 Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Cor-
porations,” WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000); see also Alison Bennett et al., WTO 
Gives EU Green Light for $4 Billion in Sanctions Against United States Over FSCs, 
WTO Rep. (BNA) Sept. 3, 2002 (on file with author). 
56 See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group 
Analysis, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 10–15 (2003) (explaining why exporters, and subse-
quently the EU, responded to sanctions in the Bananas case); Jide Nzelibe, The 
Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Or-
ganization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 Theoretical Inquiries in L. 215, 223–26 
(2005) (discussing the effectiveness of retaliation in motivating exporters to pressure 
their own government to abandon the offending trade policy). For a formal discussion 
of how export groups can maintain a freer trade equilibrium, see Michael J. Gilligan, 
Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American 
Trade Policy 13–14 (1997). 
274 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:251 
 
tric, and Pepsi started lobbying campaigns in response to the 
threat.57
The Treasury Department put forward a proposal to change the 
tax code, but Congress was slow to act until the EU began applying 
sanctions in March 2004. The EU started gradually, applying five 
percent tariffs on several goods at first and then raising tariffs an 
additional one percent each month.58 Legislators acted relatively 
quickly after the sanctions were applied, passing the new exporter 
tax bill in October 2004.59 The EU lifted the sanctions in January 
2005, although they continue to contest aspects of the new legisla-
tion, which provide temporary tax breaks for certain exporters.60
In response to the WTO’s ruling, legislators also have recently 
repealed the Byrd Amendment, which awarded cash to domestic 
firms that brought complaints against importers.61 Congress was re-
luctant to alter the measure, but the recent threat of sanctions 
spurred action. The WTO panel authorized several contracting 
parties, including the EU and Japan, to impose $150 million in 
sanctions. The EU and Canada started applying sanctions in May 
2005, while Japan and Mexico did likewise in August 2005.62 In 
57 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Companies Plan All-Out Effort Seeking to Remove 
Products from EU Retaliation List, WTO Rep. (BNA) Sept. 16, 2002 (on file with au-
thor). 
58 See Alison Bennett, Grassley Planning ‘Full-Court Press’ in Fall As Export Tax 
Repeal Faces Big Challenges, WTO Rep. (BNA) Aug. 26, 2004 (on file with author); 
Alison Bennett et al., Senate Passes Export Tax Conference Report; Still Unclear 
When President Will Sign Bill, WTO Rep. (BNA) Oct. 13, 2004 (on file with author). 
59 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
60 Joe Kirwin et al., EU to End Sanctions in Wake of Export Bill But Plans Appeal 
of Grandfather Provisions, WTO Rep. (BNA) Oct. 26, 2004 (on file with author). A 
DSU panel recently issued a ruling in favor of the European Union on these excep-
tions. 
61 Under American trade law, domestic firms can bring claims against foreign firms 
for dumping (selling goods below cost) or for receiving certain foreign subsidies. If an 
administrative agency finds that the foreign firm has either dumped its goods or re-
ceived certain subsidies, then the United States raises the tariffs on these goods. 
Higher tariffs protect domestic industry and generate revenue for the Treasury. The 
Byrd Amendment now gives this revenue to the domestic firm that brought the com-
plaint—providing the industry with both protection and a cash reward. See Daniel 
Pruzin & Gary Yerkey, Appellate Panel Upholds WTO Decision Against Byrd 
Amendment; EU Seeks Repeal, WTO Rep. (BNA) Jan. 17, 2003 (on file with au-
thor). 
62 Michael O’Boyle, Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties on U.S. Goods Due to Noncom-
pliance With WTO Byrd Ruling, 22 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 34, at 1386 (Aug. 25, 
2005). The remaining four complaining states—South Korea, Chile, Brazil and In-
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February 2006, Congress repealed the measure in a budget recon-
ciliation bill but phased out the Byrd Amendment’s awards to im-
porters over two years.63
Even when complaining states have the right to sanction, we 
should expect that parties will often settle for something less than 
full compliance with the expected legal ruling. As Professor An-
drew Guzman notes, enforcement of the decision can be difficult 
and costly.64 Sanctions are a “double-edged sword,” injuring busi-
nesses in both the sanctioned and sanctioning states.65 Thus, gov-
ernments generally want to reach a settlement rather than impose 
sanctions for non-compliance with panel decisions. Furthermore, 
the level of sanctions authorized by the WTO may be insufficient 
to convince legislators to repeal the offending provision entirely. 
The WTO system will not keep members of Congress from violat-
dia—have reserved the right to impose sanctions. Id. Mexico aimed its punitive duties 
at the U.S. dairy industry. The Mexican government has applied a thirty percent tariff 
on dairy products, which the U.S. Dairy Council suggested would cost the United 
States $160 million in business with Mexico. See id. 
63 See Rossella Brevetti, House Approves Budget Measure Containing Byrd 
Amendment Repeal, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 5, at 184 (Feb. 2, 2006).  The 
two-year transition period has left the sanctioning governments unsatisfied with 
American action and it is currently uncertain whether these governments will con-
tinue implementing sanctions against the United States. Daniel Pruzin, Trading Part-
ners Reject U.S. Claims of WTO Compliance in Byrd Act Dispute, 23 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 260 (Feb. 23, 2006). 
64 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Inter-
state Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. Legal Stud. 303, 306, 323–24 (2002) [here-
inafter Guzman, The Cost of Credibility]; Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of Inter-
national Agreements, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 579, 580 (2005). 
65 Yerkey, supra note 57 (quoting spokesman for United States Trade Representa-
tive Robert B. Zoellick). Sanctions can be both beneficial and costly for the sanction-
ing state to apply. Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth be Pulled? An Analysis of 
WTO Sanctions, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law 602, 621–22 
(Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002). Sanctions impose a dead-
weight loss on the sanctioning state’s economy. From a political economy perspective, 
the sanctioning government may gain some domestic political support if the sanctions 
can provide protection (rents) to some domestic producer groups. The likely political 
benefits of the sanctions will be small, however, because the sanctions that are most 
effective against the defendant state (that is, the sanctions that will lead to the great-
est political pain for the defendant state’s policymakers) are often not the same sanc-
tions that bring the most benefits to the sanctioning state’s government (that is, the 
sanctions do not provide rents to the domestic constituents that offer the greatest po-
litical benefits to the sanctioning government). 
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ing multilateral trade agreements, but it increases the costs of such 
violations. 
C. Restricting the Offensive Use of Trade Sanctions 
As much as international trade law favors exporters, the WTO 
dispute settlement system cannot be viewed as simply the tool of 
export interest groups. Exporters may generally prefer freer trade 
policies, but at least some exporters also want the United States to 
use sanctions unilaterally to open foreign markets. The President 
has a statutory obligation under Section 301 trade law to examine 
exporters’ claims of a foreign government’s unfair trade practices 
and to address violations.66 Congress “authorizes” the President to 
adjust tariff levels to enforce compliance by other governments 
with international trade agreements, but often the President does 
not want this authority.67 Congressional intrusion into trade rela-
tions has the potential to upset ongoing economic negotiations or 
other diplomatic endeavors. Accordingly, the executive can be re-
luctant to use the trade policy tools included in the statute, which 
has led Congress to limit the executive’s discretion to refuse re-
taliatory measures.68
But the WTO system limits the ability of the United States to act 
offensively: The United States can apply sanctions only when au-
thorized to do so through the dispute resolution system. The result 
is that the international rules curtail the power of exporters to 
lobby the government into taking measures to open up foreign 
markets. This international restriction further expands the Presi-
dent’s domestic bargaining power by giving him a means to deflect 
exporter pressure where the legal claim is weak, while still permit-
ting the President to sanction foreign nations for true violations of 
trade law. 
66 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2000). 
67 See Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A 
Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in Aggressive Unilateralism, 
supra note 7, at 49, 57–65. 
68 In 1988, Section 301 was amended to require that the executive take action when 
other governments violated international trade law. Retaliation was made “manda-
tory” to spur a recalcitrant executive into international action, but the statute retained 
loopholes that permitted a limited level of executive discretion. See 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2411(a), 2414(a)(1) (2000); Bello & Holmer, supra note 67, at 64. 
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An example is Kodak’s complaint against Japan. For years, Ko-
dak had lobbied Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton over 
alleged Japanese unfair trade practices. Kodak maintained that the 
Japanese structured their film market to prevent Kodak from com-
peting with Fuji film and that this market structure was a violation 
of international trade law. With the support of prominent New 
York Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Alfonse D’Amato, 
Kodak pushed for the application of unilateral sanctions by the 
United States.69 The Clinton Administration recognized that the 
claim did not fall within traditional areas of international trade law: 
Kodak was effectively making an antitrust claim and the WTO did 
not require nations to adopt antitrust laws.70 In addition, sanctions 
would have seriously complicated relations with one of the United 
States’ largest trading partners. 
Once the WTO system was up and running, President Clinton 
decided to take Kodak’s claim to the new dispute resolution sys-
tem. Kodak initially resisted this move but changed its mind once it 
was clear that the President would not adopt unilateral sanctions.71 
The panel ultimately found that Japan had not violated the trade 
agreement, and the President opted not to appeal the loss.72 The 
WTO remedied the domestic pressure to act by adjudicating Ko-
dak’s claim without throwing trade relations with Japan into tur-
69 See Iida, supra note 33, at 10–13; Keith Bradsher, Kodak is Loser in Trade Ruling 
on Fuji Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1997, at A1. 
70 See Patricia Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking “Reason-
able Expectations,” 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1601, 1606, 1618–20 (1999); Paul B. Stephan, 
Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization, 1 Chi. J. 
Int’l L. 49, 57–58 (2000). 
71 See Trade Group Will Decide Kodak Case, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1996, at D4; see 
also Hamilton Loeb & Benham Dayanium, Unilateralism in International Trade Re-
lations: The Recent United States-Japan Experience and Privatization of Unilateral-
ism?, 16 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 77, 88 (1999) (noting that “the handling of the Ko-
dak case by the USTR [United States Trade Representative] shows some reasons for 
hope that the unilateral approach is falling into disfavor. Kodak made no secret that it 
wanted the USTR to keep the case as a unilateral Section 301 action, rather than refer 
it to the WTO. Its chief executive and outside counsel both have long histories of suc-
cessful pleading at the USTR. They did not prevail on this point.”). 
72 Report of the Panel, supra note 18, at 488–89. See also John Maggs, US May Buck 
Tide, Take on the WTO, J. Com., Apr. 9, 1998, at A1 (noting U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Charlene Barshefsky’s announcement that the Kodak decision would not be ap-
pealed). 
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moil.73 The President was able to appear receptive to domestic 
trade complaints, as demanded by domestic law, while legitimately 
refusing to apply sanctions because of the WTO ruling.74
The Kodak example illustrates that the President can satisfy an 
exporter’s demand for redress by taking the case to the WTO. If 
the panel is faithful to the texts of the agreements, it will authorize 
sanctions in meritorious cases and reject claims with less merit. 
When sanctions are applied under WTO authority the dispute is 
less likely to escalate than when sanctions are leveled unilaterally 
by a complaining state based on its own interpretation of trade law. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Although American negotiators consistently pushed for rule-
based dispute resolution in international negotiations, the Presi-
dent had no easy task getting Congress to approve the new WTO 
dispute resolution system after negotiations concluded. As an ob-
server of the Uruguay Round negotiations noted: 
[T]here was also a long and sometimes anxious wait for govern-
ments to obtain the approval of national legislatures for the Uru-
guay Round package. Anxiety was greatest over approval by the 
US Congress, where some legislators argued that national sover-
eignty might be infringed by the new dispute settlement proce-
dures for which American negotiators had fought so long.75
When Uruguay Round negotiations began, the EU was blocking 
the panel process or delaying the implementation of panel deci-
sions in five cases in which the United States was a plaintiff.76 Con-
sequently, members of Congress were initially supportive of 
stronger international rules for dispute settlement. When Congress 
authorized the President to negotiate the Uruguay Round under 
73 See Stephan, supra note 70, at 72. 
74 See Charles A. Brill & Brian A. Carlson, U.S. and Japanese Antimonopoly Policy 
and the Extraterritorial Enforcement of Competition Laws, 33 Int’l Law 75, 115 
(1999) (arguing that “transferring the [Kodak] dispute to the WTO allowed the [Clin-
ton] administration to avoid the potential fallout from adjudicating the dispute while 
simultaneously showing support for the WTO”). 
75 See Croome, supra note 1, at 380. 
76 The United States filed complaints concerning wheat flour, pasta products, 
canned fruit products, citrus products, and the European value-added tax. See Hudec, 
supra note 51, at 200–24. 
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“fast-track” procedures in the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, legislators included negotiation instructions. On 
the topic of dispute resolution, Congress instructed that: 
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with re-
spect to dispute settlement are (A) to provide for more effective 
and expeditious dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures; 
and (B) to ensure that such mechanisms within the GATT and 
GATT agreements provide for more effective and expeditious 
resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement of United 
States rights.77
Note that Congress’ focus was on the “better enforcement of 
United States rights”—that is, multilateral acceptance of the United 
States’ unilateral actions (through Section 301 sanctions), rather 
than a commitment to multilateral dispute resolution. Congres-
sional support for the dispute resolution procedures fell as legisla-
tors contemplated having to change domestic law to comply with 
international rules. Presidential support for strong dispute resolu-
tion procedures did not decrease, however, and American trade 
negotiators continued to demand that the contracting parties sub-
mit all trade claims to third-party adjudication. The final negoti-
ated agreement included stronger dispute settlement provisions 
even though the President anticipated congressional opposition to 
these procedures. 
The Uruguay Round package received a mixed reception in 
Congress. Although legislators were happy with the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), the agreement to 
open up foreign markets in services, and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), the 
agreement to provide greater intellectual property protections, 
they argued that the new WTO dispute resolution procedures 
would lead to a loss of legislative sovereignty.78 Despite this con-
cern, the “fast-track” process prevented members of Congress 
77 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1) (2000). 
78 See Hudec, supra note 51, at 14–15, 193–94; Gary N. Horlick, WTO Dispute Set-
tlement and the Dole Commission, 29 J. of World Trade 45, 46 (1995); Gary R. 
Saxonhouse, Dispute Settlement at the WTO and the Dole Commission: USTR Re-
sources and Success, in Issues and Options for U.S.-Japan Trade Policies 363, 363 
(Robert M. Stern ed., 2002). 
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from changing the result of the international negotiations. They 
agreed to vote on the Uruguay Round as a package because reject-
ing the negotiations wholesale would result in the loss of the bene-
fits in services and intellectual property. Of course, if Congress had 
rejected the package, the Uruguay Round agreement would have 
been renegotiated. As negotiations had already gone on for seven 
years, demands to renegotiate would mean that the benefits of the 
trade agreement would not be realized for several more years. 
Why did legislators agree to a dispute resolution system that lim-
ited its own bargaining power in the international trade system? 
The President prefers such a system because the international con-
straint increases his bargaining power domestically. But why would 
Congress approve this system? Not only do legislators lose bargain-
ing power with other nations, they also lose bargaining power rela-
tive to the President. 
Legislators agreed to the Uruguay Round because it was bun-
dled with other substantive agreements that they wanted. Under 
these circumstances, we should expect legislators to attempt to un-
bundle these agreements—accepting the agreement they prefer 
and rejecting the dispute resolution agreement. This is exactly what 
we observe when the Uruguay Round Agreement was submitted to 
Congress for approval. Legislators attempted to un-bundle the 
agreements, accepting the TRIPS, GATS, and GATT agreements, 
but rejecting the DSU agreement. But the attempt to un-bundle 
the Uruguay Round agreements failed. Trade negotiations depend 
on governments committing themselves ex ante to accept or reject 
the terms of the agreements wholesale. Without such fast-track ne-
gotiating authority, other governments will not engage in free trade 
negotiations. 
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, who supported the sub-
stance of the agreement, attempted to separate the dispute resolu-
tion system from the rest of the trade package by agreeing to sup-
port the Uruguay Round agreement if the President promised to 
support subsequent legislation aimed at limiting the dispute resolu-
tion system. Dole’s legislation proposed an “escape-hatch” from 
adverse WTO decisions. An independent commission of federal 
judges would review the WTO panel and appellate body reports 
and determine whether the bodies had exceeded the treaty’s au-
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thority.79 If the commission found that the bodies were acting inap-
propriately, then any legislator could propose a joint resolution of 
Congress seeking the United States’ withdrawal from the WTO.80
President Clinton agreed to support the bill, conditioned on Re-
publican support of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation, 
but the Dole legislation was never enacted. Amendments to the 
legislation that placed private actors, including trade lawyers and 
labor leaders, on the review body poisoned legislative support for 
the proposal.81 Even if the legislation had passed, withdrawal from 
the WTO was an extreme strategy that legislators were unlikely to 
adopt.82
The limited response by Congress is, in part, a result of the 
President’s agenda-setting powers when negotiating trade agree-
ments. International trade agreements are package deals—other 
nations will not negotiate trade agreements with the United States 
unless Congress commits to accepting or rejecting the entire pack-
age negotiated by the President (known as “fast-track” negotiating 
authority).83 Congress can always reject the agreement, expecting 
79 Saxonhouse, supra note 78, at 364. 
80 See John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, 89 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
317, 322 (1995); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Or-
ganizations, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 398, 418 (1996/1997). If the Commission found 
that the bodies had acted outside of their authority, then any member of Congress 
could introduce a resolution calling on the President to renegotiate the dispute resolu-
tion system. If the Commission found three or more instances of such actions, then 
any legislator could introduce a call for withdrawal from the WTO. If the President 
signed the legislation, the United States would begin exiting from the treaty. Saxon-
house, supra note 78, at 364. 
81 See Saxonhouse, supra note 78, at 364–66. Later versions of the legislation (as 
amended by Senator Byrd) attempted to set up two commissions. The first would be 
made up of senators who would review the WTO procedures. The second would be 
composed of private actors—trade lawyers, labor leaders, or others—who would re-
view the panels’ findings. See id. at 365; see also Horlick, supra note 78, at 48. 
82 The implementing legislation of the Uruguay Round allows for joint resolutions of 
Congress to withdraw from the WTO. Such a resolution was introduced in the House 
of Representatives in 2000 but was defeated by a vote of 363–56. Several members of 
the House announced their intention to introduce a similar resolution in 2005. These 
detractors were concerned about the loss of American jobs and the increased ten-
dency of the WTO panel to rule against the United States. See Gary G. Yerkey, 
USTR Defends U.S. Membership in WTO as House Disapproval Resolution Takes 
Shape, 22 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 9, at 326 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
83 Fast-track effectively alters Congressional rules for considering legislation by 
promising that the agreement, without amendment, would be presented on the floor of 
each house within a specified period of time. The system includes “anti-bottling,” 
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that other states would then agree to renegotiate, but this strategy 
is costly to legislators who want the benefits of the trade agreement 
because it delays the implementation and reopens negotiations in 
other areas. But legislators should have rejected the agreement—
with renegotiation in mind—if the costs of dispute resolution were 
high enough. 
Congress can always eliminate the President’s agenda-setting 
power by engaging in unilateral trade policies. The Constitution al-
locates to Congress the power to set international commercial pol-
icy. The President only has significant trade-policy power (beyond 
his veto power) because the United States has chosen to engage in 
multilateral trade negotiations.84 If Congress wished to undertake 
unilateral free trade policies, then the President’s bargaining lever-
age would be reduced to threatening a veto, the same as in the 
realm of domestic legislation. Congress is unlikely to take such 
steps, however, because reciprocal agreements are valuable politi-
cal commodities.85 International agreements offer domestic export-
ers greater access to foreign markets, which could be lost if Con-
gress were to pursue the unilateral route. 
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND STATE INTERESTS 
This Essay provides a causal mechanism for how international 
institutions can “change” state interests and why domestic actors 
may create international institutions for exactly that purpose. 
“anti-Christmas Tree,” and “anti-filibuster” elements—trade agreements cannot be 
stuck in committee, amended, or filibustered. The committee and filibuster additions 
prevent Congress from effectively killing trade agreements by not allowing the 
agreements to reach the floor or not permitting a vote. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 
Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 Brook. J. Int’l L. 143, 145–52 (1992); 
Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast 
Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 7–10 (2003). 
84 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
85 If the government simply wanted to maximize aggregate wealth, it would under-
take unilateral trade liberalization policies. See Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism, 
supra note 7, at 16–17. Reciprocal trade agreements are a second-best solution in a 
world of interest group politics, where consumers do not organize for lower prices but 
import-competing industries lobby for protection. Reciprocal trade agreements are a 
valuable political commodity because they balance interest group pressures—
exporters organize to lobby for greater access to foreign markets. 
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A. State Interests 
We think of states as having interests even though we know that 
various policymakers within the government have differing policy 
preferences. For instance, it is common to discuss the United 
States’ interests in some area of international relations, while at the 
same time recognizing that within the government there is intense 
disagreement about what the United States should do internation-
ally. The President and members of Congress often loudly disagree 
over foreign policy, and legislators fight among themselves. In de-
mocratic governments, our concept of unified national interests 
comes from elected officials acting through set procedures to reach 
policy outcomes. These outcomes are what we think of as “state in-
terests.” By changing domestic procedures—for instance, effec-
tively increasing the President’s lawmaking powers—state interests 
change as well. 
International bodies can shift power within domestic politics and 
thereby change the results of the domestic political process. In ad-
dition, the domestic actors who are advantaged by the shift in 
power may move policymaking to the international level in the 
hope of achieving greater domestic standing. The WTO effectively 
shifts greater bargaining power in the trade context to the Presi-
dent when he negotiates with Congress. The President supported a 
rule-based dispute resolution system for exactly this purpose, de-
spite the relative loss of bargaining power it involved for the U.S. 
in international politics. 
Interestingly, international law and international courts can ef-
fectively change domestic politics, yet not have particularly high 
rates of compliance. There is no guarantee that domestic policy 
outcomes will match those demanded by international law. In fact, 
we expect that states will frequently settle. Given the distribution 
of preferences among elected officials, a range of trade policies will 
be supportable. By shifting agenda-setting power, the trade policy 
selected from the range of supportable policies may also change, 
and the President might select a different trade policy than legisla-
tive leaders would. 
Under the WTO, we should expect the United States to adopt 
policies more consistent with international trade agreements, but 
not fully consistent with the demands of international law. The new 
WTO system gives the President greater bargaining power, but the 
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President cannot impose, and might not prefer, the policy required 
by international law. Indeed, the President acts out of his own self-
interest, not because of the persuasive influence of a legal decision. 
The international system thus gives the President the opportunity 
to move trade policy closer to his policy preferences. 
B. Implications for Views of International Law 
The view presented in this Essay contrasts with other interna-
tional law approaches that seek to understand states’ desires for 
and compliance with international law and judicial institutions. 
Disagreement about how we determine states’ interests motivates 
much of the debate within international law scholarship, fueling 
the differing expressions of optimism or skepticism about compli-
ance with international agreements and the future of international 
adjudication. International law studies currently take two opposing 
views of why states abide by international rules: Either states regu-
larly abide by the rules because of international law’s “compliance 
pull,” or states abide by the rules only when it is in their self-
interest. 
The compliance-pull view has several variants, but all share the 
understanding that states comply with international law because a 
state comes to believe that international law is in its interest—
either because the rules are fair or because domestic actors come 
to prefer the international rule. Dean Harold Koh maintains that 
state interests are altered through the transnational legal process, 
where domestic-level actors—from judges to legislators to individ-
ual activists—bring international law home.86 For instance, private 
litigants go to courts and have judges accept the international rule 
as federal common law or they lobby legislators to pass domestic 
law that reflects the international norm.87 Through this transna-
tional legal process, the government’s understanding of its interests 
changes—the government incorporates the international norm into 
its concept of its national identity. Here, the state obeys interna-
86 See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623, 626, 643 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International 
Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 
183 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale 
L.J. 2599, 2602 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?]. 
87 See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 86, at 642–43. 
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tional law not just to obtain benefits from the international system 
but because national views have changed.88 Similarly, Professor 
Thomas Franck argues that the legitimacy and fairness of interna-
tional law exerts a compliance pull on states, leading governments 
to change their conception of their interests in accepting interna-
tional law.89 The compliance-pull framework would predict a high 
level of compliance with international law over a wide range of is-
sues. 
More importantly for the project advanced in this Essay, the 
compliance-pull approach would predict that international law 
changes state interests. But we do not know how. Neither concep-
tion of the compliance-pull approach specifies the causal mecha-
nism that leads states to abide by international obligations. Koh 
provides examples where international law has influenced national 
policies through lobbying or court decisions, but he does not pre-
sent a theory for how international laws are integrated into domes-
tic law.90 The transnational legal process does not predict when 
courts will choose to enforce international rules over domestic 
rules, nor when lobbying efforts will be successful. Franck also 
does not explain why domestic actors would choose international 
rules, simply because they perceive them as fair, over domestic 
rules. If policymakers are responsive to interest groups and voters, 
then it is far from clear why they would incur domestic wrath for 
the sake of international fairness. Moreover, Franck cannot predict 
when fairness will lead governments to comply with international 
law and when it will not. 
By contrast, the unitary-rational state approach argues that a 
state will comply with international law only when it is in the 
state’s interests.91 Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue 
88 See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 86, at 2651. 
89 See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 7–8 (1995). 
90 Others have also made this observation. See Robert O. Keohane, When Does In-
ternational Law Come Home?, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 699, 700–01 (1998); Eric A. Posner, 
International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 797, 800–01, 812 
(2005). 
91 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 9 (2005) 
[hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Limits of International Law]; Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 113, 134–40 (2003) (arguing that states form customary international law and 
comply with it only when doing so is in their interests) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Pos-
ner, Rational Treaties]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
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that international law does not change state interests, although a 
state’s action may change because the state engages in strategic 
games with other nations. In strategic games, a state’s action will 
depend on what it expects other states will do.92 For instance, a 
state might face a prisoner’s dilemma, where cooperation is benefi-
cial only if other states also adopt cooperative strategies. A treaty 
is helpful because it sets out the expected pattern of cooperation by 
defining the terms of cooperation and monitoring state action.93 
The treaty might thereby make the state more likely to take the 
cooperative action, rather than the defecting action, because it ex-
pects that other states will do the same.94
Compared to the compliance-pull approach, the unitary-rational 
state approach is more skeptical of the importance of international 
law. It predicts that there will be a non-trivial amount of non-
compliance with international law because states will often find 
that defection maximizes their expected gains. Goldsmith and Pos-
ner expect that states often will not comply when their short-term 
gains from defections will outweigh future losses.95 International 
law simply makes cooperative action easier to monitor, thereby 
International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1115 (1999) (arguing the same regarding 
treaty formation and compliance) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Customary In-
ternational Law]. Other international law scholars also adopt a rationalist view, in-
cluding Andrew Guzman. See, e.g., Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 64, 
at 306–07. 
92 See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 World Pol. 25, 
38–40 (1985). 
93 Professor Robert Keohane made the seminal statement of this argument. See 
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Politi-
cal Economy 244–45 (1984); see also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 
125–41 (1984). 
94 Goldsmith and Posner argue such cooperative activity could arise through infor-
mal, non-legal agreements. Treaties would not always be necessary but are often used 
instead of informal agreements because they provide information about domestic 
support and indicate the seriousness of the state’s commitment. See Goldsmith & 
Posner, Rational Treaties, supra note 91, at 122–34; see also John K. Setear, An Itera-
tive Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and In-
ternational Law, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139, 140 (1996) (explaining the “iterative perspec-
tive” on treaties, which points to treaties as encouraging “repeated interactions 
among nations” and international cooperation). 
95 See Goldsmith & Posner, Limits of International Law, supra note 91, at 9. Ra-
tional approaches to international law from political science predict that states simply 
will not enter into “deep” agreements because the states are unwilling or unable to 
pay the costs of enforcement. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about 
Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379, 387 (1996). 
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making cooperative behavior more likely.96 In addition, the unitary-
rational actor approach expects that international law will have lit-
tle or no effect on state behavior when states heavily discount fu-
ture gains in favor of present gains. 
This Essay adds to the debate in international law by adopting a 
rationalist framework while arguing that international law can 
change state interests. My approach does not, however, view the 
state as unitary. Instead, different policymakers within the gov-
ernment have different views of what is in the state’s interest. In 
democracies, the state arrives at its interests by aggregating these 
different views through set decision-making procedures. I argue 
that international law can influence state interests: By shifting the 
bargaining power in national decision-making, the outcome of do-
mestic politics changes, and state interests change along with it. 
Moreover, my approach yields ex ante predictions of how 
international law will change state interests, while current 
compliance-pull approaches do not. Where the President and 
Congress share policy jurisdiction but have different preferences 
over policy, the President may try to move policymaking to the 
international level as a means of changing domestic policy 
processes. In these circumstances, international law changes state 
interests by altering how national politics works. The claim here is 
not that international law always changes state interests. Quite the 
contrary, this two-level game approach only views international 
law as changing state interests when it affects the process of do-
mestic policymaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Why does the United States want a rule-based system to settle 
international disputes? The WTO court decreases the nation’s bar-
gaining power in international politics, so why would the nation not 
only sign on, but also champion the creation of the court? To an-
swer this question, we have to understand domestic politics as well 
as international politics. International constraints, particularly in-
ternational courts, can influence bargaining at the national level by 
reallocating bargaining power among members of the government. 
Domestic actors, even in powerful states, support international 
96 See Goldsmith & Posner, Customary International Law, supra note 91, at 1120–
23. 
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courts when doing so improves their standing in national politics. 
The President supported a strong WTO court as a means to in-
crease his control of trade policy on the domestic level, even 
though the court limits the nation’s bargaining power in interna-
tional politics. 
 
